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Regulatory reform of capital markets is high on policy makers’
agenda. Since the 2008 crisis, ﬁnancial transaction taxes and bans
on short selling have seen strong political support. More than 30
countries implemented short-selling bans in 2008, and the domi-
nant member states of the European Union are determined to
impose a ﬁnancial transaction tax on all market participants,
including ﬁnancial intermediaries. Policy makers praise both mea-
sures for their ability to stabilize markets. Financial practitioners,
in contrast, claim that these regulations reduce liquidity and
increase the cost of capital.
While the ﬁnance literature emphasizes the impact of regula-
tion on liquidity, price discovery and volatility, economists tend
to be more concerned with speculative trading and excessive
risk-taking. We attempt to bridge the gap by integrating trading
and portfolio management in a numerical model with market
microstructure and heterogeneous agents.1 The goal is to providea framework which represents a wide range of potentially important
mechanisms, and where the equilibrium effects of these mecha-
nisms can be measured and compared across different regulatory
regimes in a coherent manner. To this end, the model offers detailed
information on portfolio holdings, order ﬂow, liquidity, cost of capi-
tal, price discovery, short-term volatility and long-term price
dynamics. Since the interrelation between portfolio holdings, liquid-
ity and trading decisions is likely to be of critical importance during
periods of market distress, the model contains an exogenous busi-
ness cycle process that will enable us to quantify the effect of regu-
lation on long swings in asset prices.
The model is populated by a large number of fund managers
who use quantitative strategies to manage portfolios of stocks
and bonds on behalf of their clients. Assets can be traded by sub-
mitting orders to an exchange which operates a continuous double
auction. Competition among funds is modeled as a multiperiod
tournament based on past performance. Survival depends on
realized performance, with new entrants exerting pressure on
low-performing funds by increasing their risk of client attrition.2
Brown et al. (1996) and Brown et al. (2001) have demonstrated thatnse with
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ciated with the entry and exit of managed funds.
To solve the model, we represent the quantitative trading strat-
egies of individual funds as computer programs, and apply a
genetic programming algorithm to capture the processes of com-
petition and innovation in the market for portfolio management
services. The algorithm operates by arranging tournaments among
randomly selected funds at the end of each trading day. In every
tournament, the two worst performing funds are replaced by
new entrants whose strategies are obtained by copying, crossing
and mutating the computer programs of the two best performing
ones. We run the model for a large number of trading days and
check for convergence to an equilibrium by (a) testing for struc-
tural breaks in the relationship between market prices and risk-
neutral asset prices, and (b) estimating a stochastic discount factor
model to test whether the market prices of the converged model
are consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium.
An important feature of this modeling approach is that risk
preferences and other trader characteristics are endogenous. In
particular, there are no utility functions and no preassigned roles
as informed/uninformed, liquidity trader and the like. Instead,
the model implements Alchian’s (1950) ‘as if’ view of rational
behavior as the outcome of a competitive evolutionary process. It
should be emphasized that the absence of explicit preferences
and roles entails neither risk neutrality, nor symmetric informa-
tion, nor otherwise identical agents. Our stochastic discount factor
model reveals that market prices are consistent with a rational
expectations equilibrium for an economy with a representative
agent who maximizes logarithmic utility. At the same time, among
individual funds we ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity in terms of risk-
taking, trading activity and information usage. Some funds seek
high risk by taking leveraged, speculative positions while others
are passive, risk averse investors holding the market portfolio.
We also observe specialization on trading styles such as news trad-
ing, value trading and market making. Since styles differ by selec-
tive use of information, specialization on styles becomes an
endogenous source of asymmetric information in the model con-
sidered here.
In this paper, we apply the modeling framework to forecast the
equilibrium effects of ﬁnancial transaction taxes and constraints
on short selling and leverage. Four regulatory scenarios are consid-
ered: (i) A benchmark scenario, calibrated to the S&P 500 index and
current U.S. stock market regulations, where trade is subject to ini-
tial and maintenance margin requirements and no transaction tax
is levied; (ii) a short-selling ban, corresponding to a permanent and
global implementation of the ban of short selling that was imposed
during the ﬁnancial crisis; (iii) a ban of all leveraged trade (both
short-selling and borrowing); and (iv) a tax of 10 basis points on
the value of each trade imposed on both counterparties to the
transaction.
1.1. Policy implications
The model provides detailed information about the quantitative
effects of these regulatory measures. We ﬁnd that good market
liquidity comes at the cost of high short-term volatility and
enhanced long swings in asset prices. Informational efﬁciency of
prices, however, can be obtained without regard to the preferred
mix of liquidity and market stability. Liquidity is best under the
current regulatory regime, while market stability is best under a
full leverage ban. A short-selling ban provides a compromise but
with the additional beneﬁt of a lower cost of capital. Financial
transaction taxes, in contrast, entail costs but no signiﬁcant
beneﬁts.
Although the model captures a considerable amount of institu-
tional detail, it still abstracts from many real-world aspects thatcould alter these conclusions. For instance, since the model has
only one risky asset and no labor income or consumption, there
is little scope for policy reforms to have an impact on the beneﬁts
from risk sharing and hedging. Another concern is the cost of infor-
mation acquisition, which can be expected to inﬂuence the effect of
regulation on price discovery via incentives to collect and act on
information. In this paper, information is freely available, but any
strategy that uses it entails model risk, i.e., the strategy might fail
in unfamiliar situations. The associated cost is positive for inves-
tors who trade on information, and zero for investors with buy-
and-hold strategies. Apart from that, we know very little about
the magnitude of this cost of using information, and therefore
our estimated effects of policy reforms on price discovery are prob-
ably off the mark. With these caveats in mind, we continue with a
detailed discussion of the results.
1.2. Benchmark
The benchmark scenario is characterized by high trading activ-
ity in terms of volume, order size and trade frequency, and low
transaction costs measured by bid-ask spread and market impact.
Average daily turnover is 2.5% of outstanding shares, and the
quoted bid-ask spread is approximately 10 basis points.
We observe a high degree of heterogeneity with respect to
investment strategies. However, we ﬁnd that funds can be classi-
ﬁed by a small number of common styles which can be interpreted
as value trading, news trading/arbitrage and market making/
liquidity supply. There is a strong size effect with smaller funds
tending to hold extreme positions and submit large orders relative
to wealth under management.
The most active traders are leveraged funds with speculative
trading strategies. Just over 9% of wealth is held by these funds,
but they contribute half of the trading volume. We ﬁnd that trades
by leveraged funds tend to cause transient price volatility which is
exploited by informed traders. Leveraged funds are liquidity takers,
while funds that make long-term investments in the market port-
folio are net liquidity suppliers. We ﬁnd that speculators, by being
net liquidity consumers, stimulate liquidity supply which leads to
an increase in market liquidity in equilibrium.
On average, stocks trade at a 25% discount to their risk-neutral
price, which suggests that the representative fund is mildly risk-
averse. This discount is strongly counter-cyclical. Short selling con-
tributes to high discounts during recessions. In part this is an effect
of delegated portfolio management due to the principle-agent rela-
tionship identiﬁed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Short positions
are increased when stock prices fall because short sellers outper-
form the market during these periods. In rising markets, the oppo-
site is true. This leads to counter-cyclical short interest in our
model. During recessions, short sellers’ positions are bets on bank-
ruptcies or ﬁnancial restructuring of companies in the real econ-
omy. Either event will reduce or even clear their short positions
at no cost which implies that the short-term realized performance
of short sellers is better than the market average. Occasionally, this
mechanism leads to bear runs which aggravate downturns and
amplify long swings in asset prices, as measured by the mean stock
price decline from a peak in an expansion to a trough in the next
recession.
We also observe short squeezes which can occur when some
short sellers are forced to buy due to margin violations. When
the resulting buy pressure causes the price to rise, more margin
calls can ensue which further increases demand for the stock. We
ﬁnd that in these situations funds with leveraged long positions
act as sellers. Their supply, however, does not fully satisfy the
demand from distressed buyers. By waiting rather than selling
now, leveraged long funds keep the option of selling later to even
more distressed buyers.
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The policy debate on the beneﬁts of transaction taxes has a long
history in economics. Keynes (1936) argued that excessive short-
term trading by uninformed traders could lead to speculative bub-
bles and should be discouraged through transactions taxes. The
proposal was revived by Tobin (1978) as a tax on foreign exchange
to reduce short-term international capital mobility. Stiglitz (1989)
and Summers and Summers (1989) lend their support to the tax as
a means to discourage wasteful information gathering and prevent
market crashes. Since then ﬁnancial transaction taxes have
received considerable support among academics, and European
policy-makers have taken steps towards their implementation.3
We ﬁnd that a tax on ﬁnancial transactions has a strong nega-
tive impact on trading activity and liquidity. This is due to an
increase in transaction costs which in part is a direct effect of the
tax. However, the tax also has an indirect effect of roughly the
same size due to wider bid-ask spreads and greater market impact.
The increase in the bid-ask spread is a partial compensation to
market makers for the additional cost of doing business after impo-
sition of the tax. Of the total tax burden, 97.5% is borne by liquidity
takers.
Higher transaction costs lead to more long-term investment in
the market portfolio, as suggested by the proponents of the tax.
However, the wealth held by leveraged funds is only slightly
reduced to just below 9% of total investment. Differences in trading
activity also persist. In this sense, the tax fails to deter speculation.
The model illustrates that a tax on trading has a negligible effect on
portfolio holdings as it does not alter the incentive to hold short or
leveraged long positions. For the same reason, we ﬁnd no evidence
that the tax reduces long swings in asset prices. Price discovery is
less efﬁcient, but volatility is slightly lower than in the benchmark
scenario. The cost of capital is unchanged because the tax applies
to transactions of equity against debt, which does not distort rela-
tive asset prices.1.4. Short-selling ban
Empirical studies ﬁnd that bans on short selling have an asym-
metric effect on price efﬁciency (Bris et al., 2007). Other empirical
papers ﬁnd that short-selling bans reduce volatility (Chang et al.,
2007) and increase stock prices (Chang et al., 2012). Both observa-
tions are conﬁrmed by Chang et al. (2012) who use a unique data
set of Chinese stocks for which short-selling constraints were
removed in 2010.
We ﬁnd that a ban on short selling reduces trading activity to
about half the benchmark level, but without increasing transaction
costs. Order book depth is reduced, but so are order sizes, and the
net effect is a slight reduction in bid-ask spread andmarket impact.
The ban on short positions has a direct impact on speculators and
market makers. Funds that seek risky positions are forced to move
into leveraged long strategies which leads to an increase of wealth
held in leveraged long portfolios by 50%. Large passive funds are
less affected by the ban. The equilibrium effect is a reduction in
transaction costs, a calmer market with slightly improved price
efﬁciency, and substantially lower volatility.
Short-selling bans, by their very mechanics, curb speculative
bear runs. Indeed, we ﬁnd less severe decline in prices during
recessions which dampens long swings in asset prices. Less down-3 See, e.g., the Center for Economic and Policy Research’s (CEPR) open letter
‘Economists in Support of Financial Transaction Taxes’ (December 3, 2009)—and
Krugman’s opinion piece ‘Taxing the Speculators’ in the New York Times (November
26, 2009). Financial transaction taxes are recommended in the European Commis-
sion’s ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of ﬁnancial transaction
tax [. . .]’ (COM/2011/594).ward pressure on prices during downturns and lower volatility
have a positive effect on the cost of capital which is substantially
reduced by a 7% increase in the average stock price.
Empirical studies of the 2008 short-selling ban draw more neg-
ative conclusions4: Increased trading costs through wider bid-ask
spreads; reduced order book depth; and poorer price discovery. To
study these short-term effects, we simulate a ban on short selling
that is imposed after a prolonged period of severe decline in prices.
We ﬁnd that the temporary market dynamics differs from that
observed in equilibrium. During the simulated 15-day ban, percent-
age volume-weighted spreads and market impact increase by 90%
and 146% relative to the base case, while trade volume and the num-
ber of trades decrease by 22% and 18%, respectively. On day 15 of the
ban, the stock price is up 9.4% relative to the base case. Differences in
stock prices and trading activity between the two scenarios increase
throughout the temporary ban, but systematic differences in spreads
and market impact disappear halfway through the ban. These ﬁnd-
ings suggest that lower trading activity is a permanent effect of a
short-selling ban, while higher transaction costs are a temporary
phenomenon associated with an unexpected change in the regula-
tory regime.
1.5. Leverage ban
Although a ban of all short and leveraged long positions might
be impossible to enforce in practice, this scenario provides addi-
tional insight into the role of leverage for trading and market sta-
bility. As the funds’ ability to trade on differences in opinion is
curtailed, trade volume is reduced by 90% relative to the bench-
mark level. The order book is extremely shallow, but effective trad-
ing costs are only marginally higher than in the benchmark
scenario due to the drop in trade volume. Supplying liquidity
becomes less proﬁtable and trading focuses more on value than
on news. This shift in funds’ focus coincides with the lowest vola-
tility of daily returns across all scenarios. By curbing both bear runs
and speculative bubbles, the leverage ban reduces long swings fur-
ther compared to a short-selling ban.
2. Model
The model represents fund managers who trade, on behalf of
their clients, the debt and equity of an aggregate ﬁrm over an inﬁ-
nite time horizon. Trading takes place in a continuous order-driven
market, subject to margin requirements and transaction taxes.
2.1. Market and investors
2.1.1. Real economy
The real economy is represented by one aggregate ﬁrm whose
equity and debt are publicly traded. The aggregate ﬁrm generates
daily earnings per share which are determined by a geometric
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with time-varying mean. The speciﬁ-
cation of the ﬁrm’s EBIT-process follows Goldstein et al. (2001) but
adds an unobservable business cycle component as in Veronesi
(1999):
det=et ¼ gst ðlst  etÞdt þ rdWt; ð1Þ
where st is the state of the economy at time t. The economy is either
in expansion ðst ¼ 1Þ or contraction ðst ¼ 0Þ. Expected earnings are
higher during expansions, l1 > l0, and the speed of mean reversion
is higher in contractions, g0 > g1. The duration of the state of the
economy is exponentially distributed with mean 1=mst where4 See, e.g., Battalio and Schultz (2011), Beber and Pagano (2013), Boehmer et al.
(2013), Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010), Kolasinski et al. (2013), and Marsh and Payne
(2012).
7 This is equivalent to assuming that the traders will honor their obligations to the
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term trend gst ðlst  etÞ.5
The earnings process is observable, but the state of the economy
is not. An estimate of the probability distribution over the possible
states of the economy is provided using Bayes’ rule. Denote by Pt
the Bayesian estimate of the probability that the current state st
is 1. The time in years between two earnings observations is given
by D ¼ 1=ð250  100Þ. Given a prior Pt and a new earnings observa-
tion etþD, the realized earnings growth is R
e
tþD ¼ ðetþD  etÞ=et . Its
distribution is normal, see (1). The posterior PtþD is given by
PtþD ¼ expðD=m
0Þð1 PtÞb0tþD þ ½1 expðD=m1ÞPtb1tþD
ð1 PtÞb0tþD þ Ptb1tþD
where, for s ¼ 0;1,
bstþD ¼
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pD
p
r
exp  ½R
e
tþD  gsðls  etÞD2
2r2D
 !
:
The risk-neutral value of the earnings process with current state et
and Bayesian estimate Pt is
VðPt ; etÞ :¼ ð1 PtÞV0ðetÞ þ PtV1ðetÞ; ð2Þ
where VsðetÞ is calculated as the expected net present value of
future earnings per share, conditional on st ¼ s.
2.1.2. Financial securities
The aggregate ﬁrm issues stock and bonds. The bond price is
used as a numéraire and set to one. The price per share of stock
is denoted p. On day t, there are St shares and Bt bonds outstand-
ing. Debt per share is dt :¼ Bt=St . Each bond entitles its holder to a
ﬁxed overnight interest payment r > 0. Shareholders receive a div-
idend equal to the residual net income et  rdt per share.
Negative net income is associated with ﬁnancial distress of
ﬁrms in the real economy, leading to dilution of existing share-
holders’ equity through debt restructuring or bankruptcies. We
abstract from the details by assuming that negative net income
leads to interest payments that consist in part of a transfer of
shares from shareholders to bondholders. For each bond, the aggre-
gate ﬁrm pays et=dt and the shareholders make up the shortfall by
transferring ðr  et=dtÞ=pt shares to the bondholders.
We do not model the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decision but assume that it
keeps debt per share constant at d :¼ d0. At the end of every trading
day the ﬁrm issues new shares and bonds in proportions 1 : d. The
proceeds are used to increase the scale of its operations, which is
proportional to the number of shares outstanding. Investors spend
all of their income on the new issue by purchasing et=ðpt þ dÞ shares
of issued stock for each share held, and investing their remaining
income in new bonds. The number of shares and bonds bought is
then Stet=ðpt þ dÞ and Stet  ptStet=ðpt þ dÞ ¼ dStet=ðpt þ dÞ,
respectively. This leaves debt per share constant at d and yields a
total proceeds of Stet , equal to the total income of investors.
2.1.3. Order book
Shares are traded against bonds by submitting limit orders to an
exchange which operates a continuous double auction. Each order
is a commitment to buy or sell shares at the posted price up to the
announced quantity. An order crossing the spread is a market
order.6 Market orders are executed at the best price offered by the
current standing limit orders. Partial execution against limit orders
at different prices is possible, with any remaining quantity being
added to the order book. At every point in time the order book is
the collection of all non-executed orders. Limit orders are included5 Information about the earnings process is updated 100 times per day. Actual
earnings payments are determined by the value of et at the end of each trading day.
6 The term ‘market order’ is used here as short-hand for ‘marketable limit order.’in the book observing the usual price-time priority. A limit order
remains in the order book until it is executed or the trader submits
a new order which cancels any standing order by the same trader.
The bid (ask) is the highest (lowest) price among all buy (sell) orders.
2.1.4. Margin trading
Investors can trade on margin by borrowing stocks or bonds to
take on short or leveraged long positions in the stock. We do not
model individual lender-borrower contracts but impose the con-
straint that the supply of stock available for borrowing cannot
exceed the current number of shares outstanding. Margin trading
is managed by brokers, who will organize a stock loan for a short
sale, or lend bonds for a leveraged long position, using the trader’s
portfolio as collateral. We assume that each trader has a margin
account with a broker which encompasses the entire ﬁnancial sit-
uation of the trader.7
A trader’s assets consist of positive stock holdings valued at the
bid, and claims on the broker and the aggregate ﬁrm. Claims on the
broker are bonds deposited with the broker, and payments for any
shares that have been sold in the past. Claims on the ﬁrm consist of
accrued, but unsettled dividend and interest payments. Liabilities
to the broker are loans to cover leveraged long positions in the
stock, and stock loans valued at the ask. A portfolio ðBt ; StÞ held
at the end of a trading day receives the amount
rBt þ ðet  rdÞSt  bf Lt ; ð3Þ
where et  rd is the net income per share, r the overnight interest
rate, bf the broker fee, and Lt the trader’s margin loan. We assume
that a margin loan agreement must cover the trader’s current lever-
age with the addition of any that would result from the execution of
some standing limit order with positive or negative quantity Qt . The
effective margin loan is
Lt ¼ minf0;ptSt; ptðSt þ QtÞ;Bt;Bt  ptQtg:
We assume that the traders’ claims on the broker yield overnight
interest at the same rate as the bond. We also assume that margin
loans (net debt to the broker) are charged at an additional 2.5% per
annum.8
2.1.5. Margin requirements
Margin trading is subject to margin requirements which are set
by regulatory authorities and brokers. An investor holding a port-
folio with Bt bonds and St shares meets the margin requirement
Mt provided
Mt jptSt j 6 Bt þ ptSt ; ð4Þ
where pt is the bid (ask) price for a trader who is long (short) in the
stock, i.e., portfolios are marked-to-market. Initial margin require-
ments apply to new positions while existing positions are subject
to lower maintenance requirements. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve
Board (Regulation T) regulates initial margin requirements which
have been set at 50% since 1974. Maintenance margin requirements
are regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FIN-
RA) and the stock exchanges. They currently require a margin of
at least 25%, but most brokers have stricter house requirements,
typically 30–35%. If a trader’s equity ratio in a margin account falls
below the initial margin requirement, the account becomes
restricted and the broker is not allowed to increase lending. A trader
with a restricted margin account can therefore only place orders
that will increase her equity ratio, i.e., buying (selling) stocks ifbroker as long as they are ﬁnancially able to do so.
8 In practice interest on margin loans comes in addition to the call money rate,
which is the interest rate that banks charge to brokers for margin loans to their
customers. We do not distinguish between short- and long-term interest rates and
use 2.5% as a proxy for the broker’s cost of providing a margin loan.
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requirements of 50% and 33%, respectively. Under a short-selling
ban, leveraged long positions are allowed subject to fulﬁllment of
these requirements. If all margin trade is banned, investors cannot
be short in either stocks or bonds.
2.1.6. Circuit breakers and pre-trade risk management
Most exchanges use circuit breakers to halt trading in response
to large intraday market-wide declines in security prices. After a
halt, trading is usually restarted with a call auction. We simplify
by restricting the price range of submitted limit orders to the cur-
rent market price ±10%. Similar mechanisms are used by futures
market operators such as CME. We also impose a maximal order
size amounting to 1% of the total number of shares outstanding.
2.1.7. Transaction tax
A tax of 10 basis points on the value of each trade can be
imposed on both counterparties to the transaction. No exemptions
apply. Our goal is to model the current EU proposal, which aims at
taxing the ﬁnancial sector, and where the tax is paid by all market
participants, including market makers and other ﬁnancial
intermediaries.9
2.1.8. Investors
There are ﬁnitely many investors, indexed i ¼ 1; . . . ;N. Investors
will also be referred to as ‘traders,’ ‘funds’ or ‘fund managers,’
depending on the context. Each fund follows a quantitative trading
strategy which determines the current limit order, i.e., a price-
quantity pair, as a function of the information available at the time
of order submission. A trader’s information comprises knowledge
about the order book (bid, ask, and the quantities available at these
prices), the risk-neutral value of the earnings process, changes in
the stock mid price and risk-neutral value during the last 24 h, cur-
rent portfolio holdings, and state of the margin account.
2.1.9. Order submission
A trading day is divided into N time periods. In each time period,
a randomly selected trader arrives at the market. The broker ﬁrst
veriﬁes whether the trader’s current portfolio meets the mainte-
nance margin requirement and, if not, enforces compliance by issu-
ing a margin call. A margin call is modeled as a market order with a
quantity that is large enough for the trader’s post-trade portfolio to
fulﬁll the maintenance margin ratio. If the trader receives no mar-
gin call, he can submit an order to the book. The order is derived
from the trader’s strategy. Real numbers are rounded to the nearest
price tick and lot size. Positive and negative quantities are inter-
preted as buy and sell orders, respectively. A valid order is submit-
ted as is and cancels any standing order by the trader.
A trader’s strategy can produce invalid orders, i.e., orders that
fail to comply with the margin restrictions, or orders that are
meaningless. A margin violation occurs if execution of an order
would cause the trader’s margin account to become restricted, or
if already restricted, would further reduce the trader’s equity ratio.
Meaningless orders are orders whose price or quantity is not a
proper real number, e.g., as a result of division by zero. Invalid
orders are dealt with by liquidating the leveraged part of a trader’s
portfolio, as a proxy for a broker’s action to prevent potential losses
on clients with erratic behavior.
2.1.10. Closing the model
The model generates a residual ﬂow of claims which consists of
tax payments, broker fees, portfolio holdings of bankrupt funds,9 In contrast, the current British, French and Italian FTTs do not apply to market
makers. Our model can be adapted to this case by exempting limit order traders from
the tax.and portfolio holdings of funds that enter and exit the market via
tournaments. Terminated funds relinquish their portfolio holdings,
and new funds receive 20% of the average portfolio. The net ﬂows
of shares and bonds are accumulated on a daily basis, and the cur-
rent balances are redistributed among all existing funds in propor-
tion to their managed wealth at a rate of 1% per day.
2.2. Solution algorithm
The model is solved using a genetic programming (GP) algo-
rithm with tournament selection.10 The GP algorithm approxi-
mates an equilibrium by searching for new strategies that
outperform existing ones until the market is weak-form efﬁcient
and the distribution of strategies is stable. The outcome of this
search is a set of heterogeneous strategies which are adapted to
the institutional setting and geared towards survival.
Tournament selection is based on the model for the entry and
exit of managed funds proposed by Brown et al. (1996) and
Brown et al., 2001. We use wealth under management as a proxy
for past performance. The ranking position of funds that recently
entered the market is dominated by short-term realized returns
because all funds enter the market with the same initial endow-
ment. Consequently, small differences in recent realized returns
have a strong effect on the ranking position of young funds. The sit-
uation is different for large, established funds whose longevity is
due to superior past performance. These funds typically have only
few competitors with a similar amount of wealth under manage-
ment, and their ranking position is therefore less dependent on
short-term performance.
The GP algorithm operates on the computer programs which
deﬁne the trading strategies of funds. The computer programs
are implemented in machine code following Nordin (1997). Each
program consists of a list of at most 128 machine instructions
which operate on variables and constants stored in memory, using
the CPU ﬂoating point registers to store and manipulate temporary
variables. An instruction speciﬁes an operator and one or two oper-
ands. Operators consist of +, , /, , maximum, minimum, change
sign, variable manipulations swap, copy, program-ﬂow instructions,
if, goto, and relational operators <;>;6;P;¼;–. Operands consist
of 10 input variables, 4 temporary variables and 213 numerical con-
stants. When a program executes, the temporary variables are ini-
tialized to pre-deﬁned values and the instructions are performed in
order. The trader’s order (a price and a quantity) is determined by
the values of the ﬁrst two temporary variables after the program
has executed.
The algorithm starts by randomly generating a computer pro-
gram for each fund. From this initial state, trading proceeds as
explained in Section 2.1. Over many trading days, the algorithm
replaces low performing programs with genetic recombinations
of high performing ones as follows: At the end of every trading
day, there are tournaments where underperforming fund manag-
ers are replaced by new entrants who either follow investment
strategies that performed well in the past or random modiﬁcations
of those strategies. The programs of market entrants are derived
using the standard genetic operators crossover and mutation. Our
implementation of the algorithm is as follows:
1. Tournament: Randomly select eight programs from the trader
population and rank them according to wealth under
management.10 GP is an evolutionary computation technique that has proved successful in many
engineering ﬁelds (Koza, 1992). For applications of GP and related methods in
ﬁnancial economics, see, e.g., Arifovic (1996), Lensberg and Schenk-Hoppé (2007), and
Noe et al. (2003, 2006).
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by copies of the strategies of the two with the highest rank.
3. Crossover: With probability v1, recombine the genetic material
of the two copied programs by swapping randomly selected
sublists of instructions between the two programs.
4. Mutation: Each of the two programs copied undergoes a muta-
tion with probability v2: A single instruction in the program is
randomly selected, and replaced with a randomly generated
instruction.
The algorithm is run with a population of size 20,000 and four
tournaments at the end of each day. The crossover and mutation
probabilities are set to v1 ¼ 0:5 and v2 ¼ 0:95. A model run con-
sists of two stages: Solution and data collection. The number of
trading days for the solution stage is identical across scenarios
and large enough to ensure convergence. Data are then collected
during an additional 10,000 trading days.
2.3. Calibration and data set
The benchmark scenario is calibrated with the current U.S. mar-
gin requirements and no ﬁnancial transaction tax. Parameter val-
ues are either derived from empirical observations or chosen to
give results consistent with historical averages and stylized facts.
This is done by ﬁrst calibrating the earnings process to capture
those features that are related to business cycles, and the short-
term variations that arise due to earnings surprises. We then run
the model for a range of values of debt per share, and choose that
which yields a mean equity ratio closest to the 60% long-run aver-
age of S&P 500 companies. Table 1 provides the main parameter
values and details of their calibration. The parameter values of
the calibrated model are retained in the other regulatory scenarios
except for changes in margin requirements and taxation.
The data set comprises time-series of all investors’ orders and
portfolio holdings, the order book, and information about prices,
earnings and risk-neutral stock prices. It contains 200 independent
time-series over 10,000 trading days for each scenario. Realizations
of the earnings process differ between runs, but are identical across
all regulatory scenarios for each run, which allows paired statisti-
cal tests on daily data relative to the benchmark. Table 2 containsTable 1
Values of key model parameters.
Number of traders N = 20,000 Sufﬁcient
Initial shares per trader Si0 ¼ 50;000 Net supp
Initial bonds per trader Bi0 ¼ 500;000 ratio clos
Mean regime durations 1=ms 2 resp. 7 years Calibrated
Mean earnings levels ls 0.0005, resp. 0.01 Earnings
Mean reversion speeds gs 175, resp. 50 in S&P 50
Instantaneous volatility r ¼ 25% Calibratio
Trading days per year 250 Earnings
Price range ½1;100 Stock can
Tick size 0.01 Tick size
Lot size 107  St shares Initially 1
Interest rate ra ¼ 5% Annual b
Broker fee bf ¼ 2:5% Annual b
Initial/maintenance margins 50% resp. 33% Initial ma
requirem
Transaction tax (if levied) 10 basis points Paid by b
Tournaments per day 4 Entry and
is 25% ov
a National Bureau of Economic Research ‘U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Recessio
b Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) compute standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) for i
the median analyst estimate of et during the 90 day period running up to t, and pt is the
representative for ﬁrms in the S&P 500 index, and let P=E denote the P/E-ratio of the S&
relative impact on aggregate S&P 500 earnings of a one standard deviation SUE from a rep
With a P/E ratio of 20, one has ri ¼ 0:56%. Assuming that earnings surprises are
r ¼ ri
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4 500
p
 0:25 per year.summary statistics for key variables across the full data set of 8
million observations.
The risk-neutral price (RNP) per share of stock is deﬁned as
vðPt ; etÞ ¼ VðPt; etÞ  d. Here VðPt ; etÞ is the risk-neutral value of
the earnings process deﬁned in (2) and d is the risk-neutral value
of bonds per share which coincides with the number of bonds
per share. For computational purposes vðPt ; etÞ is approximated
by two polynomials in logðetÞ : vaðetÞ ¼ a0 þ a1 logðetÞ þ . . .þ
a4log
4ðetÞ, one for each state s 2 f0;1g of the economy. The
representation
ð1 PtÞvað0ÞðetÞ þ Ptvað1ÞðetÞ;
with
að0Þ ¼ ð21:0631;2:1233;0:8165;0:05959;0:001421Þ
að1Þ ¼ ð46:3463;5:7138;0:1622;0:004786;0:0002859Þ
has an R2 > 0:999 on a domain that includes all earnings realiza-
tions in our experiments.
We will use the risk-neutral stock price as a benchmark in the
statistical analysis. To compare the market price of the stock with
its RNP, we deﬁne the stock price discount pt :¼ 1 pt=RNPt . It is
positive (negative) if the stock trades below (above) its RNP.
Table 2 shows that the RNP varies between 8.8 and 27, while
the range of market prices is much wider and includes the prede-
ﬁned bounds which are set at 1 and 100. These bounds are hit
when one side of the order book is empty. The number of such
instances equals the number of missing observations for quantities
at the bid and ask: 8 days with an empty buy book at the close, and
13 days with an empty sell book. These 21 instances occurred in
the benchmark scenario of the model during 4 periods of extreme
price ﬂuctuations which lasted 16 days on average.
Convergence of the model is checked by testing for a structural
break in the relationship between the discount and the RNP of the
stock. We use data collected from the last 20% trading days of the
model solution stage. Table 3 shows no evidence of any structural
break in the time-series for the ﬁrst three scenarios. For the tax
scenario, the evidence against the null hypothesis is stronger, but
still not signiﬁcant at the 5% level.ly large population to sustain a competitive market
lies of shares and bonds are chosen to obtain a mean equity
e to the average across S&P 500 companies (about 60%)
to business cycle and earnings data from NBER and Robert Shillera
levels and reversions are calibrated to the mean decline of 64%
0 real earnings from peak to trough across the three business cycles since 1982
n of earnings volatility based on earnings-surprises datab
and interest are paid at end of each day
be traded at prices ranging from 5% to 500% of mean RNP
is about 0.625 basis points of average stock price
00, corresponding to the size of a round lot at NYSE
ond yield
roker fee on margin loans
rgin: Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation T. Maintenance margin: ‘House
ent,’ typically stricter than FINRA’s 25%
oth counterparties. Level as in current EU proposals
exit rates are 10% per year. Average attrition rate of equity fund managers
er a 3-year horizon for U.S. equity funds (Busse et al., 2010)
ns’ at www.nber.org/cycles.html and www.econ.yale.edu/shiller/data/ie_data.xls.
ndividual ﬁrms as ðet  e^tÞ=pt , where et is reported quarterly earnings per share, e^t is
share price at time t. Let rS denote the standard deviation of SUE, assume that rS is
P 500 index. The corresponding ratio based on quarterly earnings is 4P=E, and the
resentative ﬁrm i is ri :¼ 4ðP=EÞrS=500. Livnat and Mendenhall estimate rS ¼ 3:5%.
independent, which, as forecast errors, they ought to be, earnings volatility is
Table 2
Summary statistics. State variables are measured at the close of each trading day, and ﬂow variables are daily means. Short interest (long leverage) is the number of shares held
short (leveraged long) in percent of the total number of shares outstanding. Forced trades are trades generated by margin calls, and forced trade volume is the volume generated
by those trades. P5 and P95 denote the 5th and 95th percentiles.
#Obs Min. P5 Median Mean P95 Max.
State (1 = Exp., 0 = Contr.) 8,000,000 0 0 1 0.776 1 1
Bayesian state probability (P) 8,000,000 0.004 0.090 0.959 0.773 0.997 1.000
Earnings per share (annualized) 8,000,000 0.040 0.286 1.381 1.459 2.954 5.436
Risk-neutral stock price 8,000,000 8.83 14.20 21.10 20.23 24.44 27.05
Stock price 8,000,000 1.00 8.77 16.39 15.85 21.50 100.00
Stock price discount 8,000,000 3.65 0.08 0.21 0.23 0.42 0.94
Bid-ask spread (bp) 8,000,000 1.00 4.75 7.50 12.84 38.52 6141.2
Quantity at bid (1,000 shares) 7,999,992 0.1 0.4 22.1 81.3 304.4 86,202
Quantity at ask (1,000 shares) 7,999,987 0.1 0.5 21.5 74.4 285.3 84,699
Order size (shares) 8,000,000 232 847 2,438 3,347 8,959 84,840
Trades 8,000,000 129 908 2,790 2,940 5,669 12,871
Turnover (%) 8,000,000 0.01 0.12 0.65 1.09 3.41 44.62
Short interest (% of outstanding) 4,000,000 0.70 3.50 8.70 9.94 20.40 82.00
Long leverage (% of outstanding) 6,000,000 0.40 1.70 5.50 6.18 12.80 30.00
Bankruptcies (% of traders) 6,000,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.58
Forced trades (% of trades) 6,000,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.29 17.50 83.15
Forced trade volume (% of vol.) 6,000,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 2.71 88.07
Table 3
Convergence of price process. We test for a structural break in the relationship
between the risk-neutral stock price, RNPt , and discount, pt :¼ 1 pt=RNPt , towards
the end of the model solution stage. For each one of 200 independent model runs for
each scenario, we collect 300 equally spaced trading days from the last 20% of the
model solution stage. We split each sample in three and use the ﬁrst and last 100
observations for the test. This yields a total of 200 200 ¼ 40; 000 observations
for each scenario. Letting Dt be a dummy variable that is 0 in the ﬁrst half of the
sample and 1 for the second half, we estimate the model 100pt ¼ a1 þ b1RNPt þ
Dtða2 þ b2RNPtÞ þ t with AR(1) disturbances and GLS. A Chow test is used to test the
null hypothesis H0 that the coefﬁcients a2 and b2 are jointly zero. P-Values are shown
in parentheses.
Base case No short No leverage Taxation
a1 60.088 48.244 46.597 56.832
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
b1 1.735 1.427 1.250 1.619
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
a2 0.109 0.385 0.177 0.699
(0.785) (0.301) (0.615) (0.060)
b2 0.006 0.027 0.003 0.028
(0.753) (0.092) (0.843) (0.090)
H0 : a2 ¼ b2 ¼ 0
Fð1;39996Þ 0.089 1.000 0.265 3.541
P-Value (0.765) (0.317) (0.607) (0.060)
Table 4
Stochastic discount factors. Using quarterly data, we form the empirical moment
conditions ð1=TÞPTt¼1ðwt=wtþ1ÞcðRStþ1  RBtþ1Þzt ¼ 0, where c is a risk aversion param-
eter to be estimated, wt=wtþ1 denotes quarterly growth in the value of the market
portfolio, and zt ¼ ð1;Rt ; Pt  Pt1 ; et=et1Þ. Apart from the constant term, the elements
of zt represent lagged stock returns, lagged changes in the Bayesian state probability,
and lagged earnings growth. The number of observations per scenario is T ¼ 32;000.
We estimate the parameter c with two-step GMM and use a J-test with 3 degrees of
freedom to test for model misspeciﬁcation.
Base case No short No leverage Taxation
Coefﬁcient ðcÞ 1.180 0.971 1.121 1.161
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models, we estimate stochastic discount factors (SDFs) and exam-
ine their pricing errors. Let RStþD and R
B
tþD denote the gross return on
stocks and bonds during the time period from t to t þ D, and let
mtþD denote the stochastic discount factor at time t. We form the
moment conditions
E mtþD R
S
tþD  RBtþD
 
zt
h i
¼ 0; ð5Þ
where z is a vector of instruments whose values zt are predeter-
mined at time t. We choose zt ¼ ð1;Rt ; Pt  PtD; et=etDÞ, which con-
tains a constant term, lagged stock returns, lagged changes in the
Bayesian state probability, and lagged earnings growth. The idea
is that instruments and pricing errors should be uncorrelated in
order to rule out excess returns from trading on knowledge of zt .11
We assume that mtþD is proportional to ðwt=wtþDÞc, where wt
denotes the value of the market portfolio at time t. The parameter
c in the SDF can be thought of as the constant relative risk aversion
of a representative agent with direct or indirect preferences over
wealth. In view of the results on growth optimal wealth strategies11 For details on estimation and evaluation of SDF models, we refer to Cochrane
(2005, Ch. 10).and risk preferences (Kelly, 1956), we test c against the null
hypothesis that c ¼ 1, which corresponds to logarithmic utility.
We emphasize that our assumptions regarding the SDF do not
mean that the investors in our model solve explicit utility maximi-
zation problems. Investor behavior is determined by competition
for survival, and the SDF is only used to rationalize the price pro-
cess of the stock.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating the empirical counter-
part to (5) with GMM on quarterly data for each scenario. The data
sets consist of 160 quarters for each of the 200 model runs. The
estimated risk aversion coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcantly different
from 1 in any of the four scenarios, consistent with our hypothesis
of log utility maximization.
The ﬁrst three scenarios pass the model speciﬁcation test (J-
test) at the 5% signiﬁcance level, but the tax scenario does not. This
suggests that there are statistical arbitrage opportunities in the
converged models of the tax scenario. To gauge the size of these
arbitrage opportunities, we regressed the pricing errors from the
GMM model on the instruments zt . The correlation between the
actual and predicted pricing errors is 0.038, and the volatility of
the actual pricing error is 0.084. This yields a predictable pricing
error of 0:038 0:084 ¼ 0:0032 (32 basis points), which is less
than the average cost of a round trip in the tax scenario (51 basis
points, cf. Table 12). The evidence against the pricing model of
the tax scenario is therefore weaker than indicated by the J-test
in Table 4. We conclude that, with a possible exception for the
tax scenario, asset prices can be rationalized in terms of a represen-
tative agent with log utility of wealth.
Fig. 1 provides additional information on the short-run price
dynamics of the model. Autocorrelations in daily log returns are
small and generally insigniﬁcant in all scenarios, except under aP-Value ðH0 : c ¼ 1Þ (0.111) (0.816) (0.371) (0.157)
J-Test statistic 7.634 2.326 6.869 20.351
P-Value ðH0 : J ¼ 0Þ (0.054) (0.508) (0.076) (0.000)
−0.02
−0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
1 5 10 15 20
Base case
A
CF
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Fig. 1. Autocorrelations in daily log returns. For each scenario, data are collected from 200 model runs over 10,000 trading days. The mean autocorrelation functions are
computed across those 200 runs. The dashed lines connect conﬁdence intervals of ±2 standard errors computed at each lag.
Table 5
Correlations under varying business conditions in the benchmark scenario. The variables include exogenous earnings surprises (Earnings) and ﬁve groups of endogenous
variables: Risk premium (Stock price discount); trading activity (Trade volume); liquidity (Bid-ask spread, Market impact and Order book depth); intraday volatility (Volatility); and
margin trading (Short interest and Long leverage). Bid-ask spread is the difference between ask and bid, and Market impact is the absolute difference between the bid (ask) and
volume-weighted execution prices of market sell (buy) orders, both relative to the mid price. Order book depth is the average volume available at the bid and ask. Spread, Market
impact and Order book depth are intraday averages; Stock price discount, Short interest, Long leverage and Earnings are measured at the end of every trading day; and Volatility is
Garman–Klass intraday volatility computed from Open, High, Low and Close prices. All variables represent nominal changes from one trading day to the next, except for Earnings,
which represents log changes in the earnings variable e. Business conditions are deﬁned in terms of the Bayesian state probability P that the economy is currently in an expansion,
and the current outlook is positive or negative according to whether Pwas above or below its median value at the close of the previous trading day. The data set consists of 10,000
observations from each of the 200 independent runs for the benchmark scenario. To control for run level ﬁxed effects, we compute correlation matrices separately for each run
and report their average in the table.
Earnings Stock discount Trade volume Bid-ask spread Market impact Book depth Volatility Short interest
Positive outlook
Stock discount 0.66
Trade volume 0.14 0.15
Bid-ask spread 0.11 0.11 0.20
Market impact 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.78
Book depth 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.30 0.34
Volatility 0.13 0.14 0.34 0.24 0.18 0.17
Short interest 0.25 0.28 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.13
Long leverage 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.25
Negative outlook
Stock discount 0.61
Trade volume 0.09 0.09
Bid-ask spread 0.03 0.01 0.21
Market impact 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.74
Book depth 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.18 0.23
Volatility 0.05 0.04 0.32 0.29 0.23 0.12
Short interest 0.20 0.29 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05
Long leverage 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02
Table 6
Autocorrelations under varying business conditions in the benchmark scenario. Variables and data as in Table 5. Bold faced coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different from zero at a p-
value of 0.0001.
Positive outlook Negative outlook
Lag (days) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Stock discount 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Trade volume 0.27 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.01
Bid-ask spread 0.39 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.01
Market impact 0.40 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.01
Book depth 0.39 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00
Volatility 0.42 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Short interest 0.21 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
Long leverage 0.29 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
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relations below 2% are observed for lags up to 6 days. With a daily
price volatility of about 1%, the predictable abnormal return (about
2 bp) is much too small to compensate for a 51 bp roundtrip cost.
Further time-series properties of the model are provided in
Tables 5 and 6 using data from the benchmark scenario. Table 5
contains contemporaneous correlations between exogenous
earnings surprises (Earnings) and daily changes in ﬁve groups ofendogenous variables: Risk premium (Stock price discount); trading
activity (Trade volume); liquidity (Bid-ask spread,Market impact and
Order book depth); intraday volatility (Volatility); and margin
trading (Short interest and Long leverage). To gauge the effect of
varying business conditions on the time-series properties, we split
the data set at the median of the Bayesian state probability P, with
P P medianðPÞ and P < medianðPÞ representing positive and neg-
ative outlook, respectively.
Table 7
Distribution of wealth under management by investors’ portfolio position. Let
ða; bÞ :¼ ðS=S;B=BÞ for a portfolio with S stocks and B bonds, where ðS;BÞ is the
current number of stocks and bonds outstanding. If aþ b > 0, we deﬁne k ¼ a=ðaþ bÞ
and classify the portfolio as Short if k < 0:05; All bond if 0:05 6 k < 0:05;
Overweight bond if 0:05 6 k < 0:35; Market portfolio if 0:35 6 k < 0:65; Overweight
stock if 0:65 6 k < 0:95; All stock if 0:95 6 k < 1:05; and Leveraged long if k P 1:05.
If aþ b 6 0, the portfolio is classiﬁed as Short if a < 0, and as Leveraged long if b < 0.
Investors with portfolios such that a 6 0 and b 6 0 are bankrupt and excluded from
the classiﬁcation. For each trading day, we compute a histogram wð Þ on the bins of
this classiﬁcation, where wðPÞ is the percentage of total wealth managed by investors
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reduce the risk premium, volatility and trading activity, Table 5.
Short interest varies inversely with earnings across business condi-
tions, but leveraged long positions move procyclically in good
times and countercyclically in bad times. The time-series proper-
ties of margin trading are discussed in detail in Section 3.
Cross-correlations among the three liquidity measures have the
expected signs, and so does the positive correlation between trade
volume and volatility and the negative relationship between vola-
tility and liquidity. We also ﬁnd that trade volume is positively cor-
related with order book depth, and with the bid-ask spread and
market impact. The positive relationship between volume and
spread is consistent with the ﬁndings of Chordia et al. (2000,
Table 8), who attribute it to the interaction of market makers with
informed traders. Comparing markets across business conditions,
we observe that contemporaneous correlations tend to be some-
what weaker during bad times.
Table 6 contains autocorrelations of the endogenous variables
for lags up to 5 days. Our results are in line with those reported
in Chordia et al. (2001, Table IV) for all variables that overlap with
theirs, except that our data contain no calendar effects. Autocorre-
lations for intraday volatility are close to their S&P 500 counter-
parts. In bad times, ﬁrst-order autocorrelations tend to be
slightly weaker and higher-order correlations slightly stronger
than in good times.in portfolio position P. These histograms are aggregated by run. The entries in the
table are the mean values ofwðPÞ for each scenario and portfolio position. For the base
case, the p-values in parentheses refer to one-sample t-tests of zero means. For the
other scenarios, they refer to paired t-tests of differences in means between that
scenario and the base case. The number of observations is 200 in each scenario.
Position Base case No short No leverage Taxation
Short 4.06 4.62
(0.000) (0.000)
All bond 2.49 6.35 10.47 1.12
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)3. Results
This section presents quantitative results on the equilibrium
effects of leverage constraints and transaction taxes using model-
generated data on portfolio holdings, order ﬂow, liquidity, cost of
capital, price discovery, short-term volatility and long-term price
dynamics.Overweight bond 13.39 29.09 11.75 9.69
(0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)
Market portfolio 45.14 42.49 47.35 53.15
(0.000) (0.074) (0.115) (0.000)
Overweight stock 24.32 10.76 13.43 23.16
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.261)
All stock 5.46 3.83 17.00 3.90
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Leveraged long 5.10 7.48 4.34
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 8
Trading activity by investors’ portfolio positions. Trading activity sðPÞ is deﬁned as the
ratio of trading volume per unit of wealth under management by investors in position
P, relative to the average across all investors. The percentage of total trade volume by
investors in position P;vðPÞ, is calculated on the same bins as wðPÞ in Table 7. Trading
activity is given by sðPÞ ¼ vðPÞ=wðPÞ. Investors with trading activity above (below) 1
have a larger (smaller) trading volume than the average investor per unit of wealth. P-
Values in parentheses are calculated as in Table 7. The number of observations is 200
in each scenario.
Position Base case No short No leverage Taxation
Short 5.33 6.26
(0.000) (0.000)
All bond 6.63 3.75 2.25 12.78
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Overweight bond 1.41 1.06 2.44 1.67
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Market portfolio 0.39 0.49 0.52 0.32
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Overweight stock 0.48 1.29 1.60 0.46
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.537)
All stock 2.42 4.99 1.55 3.923.1. Investor behavior
Specialization is a prerequisite for success in the market for
portfolio management services. Fund managers therefore face a
number of strategic choices. The most important ones concern
investment style (product differentiation) and strategy implemen-
tation (trading and risk management). The complexity and variety
in the investment styles of fund managers pose a challenge in fore-
casting the impact of regulatory reform. The 2008 short-selling
ban, for instance, disrupted the business models of many ﬁnancial
ﬁrms who in turn decried the measure as counterproductive to its
aims. The Coalition of Private Investment Companies’s letter to the
SEC in 2011 provides an insightful account of the industry’s senti-
ment and its opposition to current regulatory proposals.12
Regulation can be beneﬁcial if it prevents investors from taking
on too much risk. For instance, Robert Shiller made a case for ﬁght-
ing speculative bubbles through active management of margin
requirements after the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000.13 More
recently, the G20 countries have taken steps to discourage excessive
leverage. Among the tangible outcomes of these initiatives is the
European Parliament’s Legislative Resolution ‘on the proposal for a
regulation [. . .] on Short Selling and certain aspects of Credit Default
Swaps’ (COM/2010/0482). This resolution seeks to restrict short sell-
ing with the aim of preventing speculative attacks against European
sovereign debt instruments and ﬁnancial institutions.
In this section, we explore the variation in investor behavior
across the different regulatory scenarios of the model. We ﬁnd that
regulation has a profound impact on trading activity, while risk12 http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-627/4627-139.pdf
13 ‘Margin Calls: Should the Fed Step In?,’ Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2000.taking and portfolio holdings are affected to a lesser extent. Trad-
ing styles are remarkably robust to regulatory change. The same
set of styles emerges in all scenarios, with some notable differences
in their relative importance.
In markets with delegated fund management, passive invest-
ment in the market portfolio offers two main advantages: Returns
in line with the market average, and low transaction costs. Returns
matching that of the market ensure low volatility of the fund man-
ager’s relative performance, which reduces the risk of client attri-
tion. Table 7 shows that in all regulatory scenarios some 40–50%
of total wealth is managed by funds that invest in the market port-
folio, while wealth held in leveraged positions (short and long)
amounts to less than 10%. This pattern is reversed with respect
to trading activity. Table 8 shows that funds holding leveraged
positions trade ﬁve to seven times more per dollar under(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leveraged long 5.24 3.96 6.72
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 9
Factor analysis of trading styles. The data consist of a random sample of two million executed trades from each scenario.
Variables B1–B4 represent trader characteristics and behavior, including a limit order dummy ðB3Þ and a measure of the
distance of the trader’s portfolio from the market portfolio ðB4Þ. Variables I1–I8 represent information usage, measured as the
sensitivity of trading decisions to changes in the information available when the order was submitted. Raw data consist of
vectors of indicator variables, where 1 indicates that a change in the relevant variable changed the quoted price by at least
one tick or the order quantity by at least one lot. Vectors of indicator variables are divided by their sum (if positive) to obtain
a measure of the extent to which the trade was based on selective information. Variables representing order book quantities
are excluded to avoid multi-collinearity, and the data are standardized by run to control for run level ﬁxed effects. The table
shows the results of estimating a three-factor model with maximum likelihood and varimax rotation for each scenario.
White and black circles correspond to positive and negative factor loadings, respectively, and circle areas represent absolute
values. In the tax scenario, the ordering of factors 2 and 3 is swapped to match their ordering by explained variance in the
other scenarios.
Base case No short No leverage Taxation
No. Variable / Factor F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3
B1 Size (log relative wealth)
B2 Relative trade volume
B3 Limit order
B4 Dist. from mkt portfolio
I1 Bid-ask spread
I2 Stock holdings
I3 Bond holdings
I4 Prices
I5 RNP
I6 Price change
I7 Change in RNP
I8 Margin account
SS loadings 2.20 1.50 1.49 2.84 1.45 1.38 2.07 1.76 1.24 2.44 1.13 1.41
Proportion Var. 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.09 0.12
Cumulative Var. 0.18 0.31 0.43 0.24 0.36 0.47 0.17 0.32 0.42 0.20 0.30 0.42
14 For example, sensitivity to the price level is measured by considering two parallel
shifts of ±1% in the bid and ask, and sensitivity to the bid-ask spread is measured by
widening and narrowing the spread by at most 4 ticks through mean preserving
changes in the bid and ask while maintaining a minimum spread of 1 tick.
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market portfolio trade less than half the average volume. Funds
holding the market portfolio thus have the traits of passive inves-
tors, while those who hold leveraged positions are active portfolio
managers.
In the model a transaction tax raises the cost of active portfolio
management and provides investors with additional incentives to
pursue passive investment strategies. As a result, in this scenario
more than 50% of total wealth is invested in the market portfolio.
The effects of leverage restrictions on wealth invested in the mar-
ket portfolio are not signiﬁcant, but the market portfolio seems to
attract more investors when a ban on short selling is extended to a
full leverage ban.
Table 7 shows that a transaction tax does not discourage lever-
age, contrary to suggestions made by its proponents. Wealth in
short positions actually increases, although by less than one per-
centage point, and wealth in leveraged long positions decreases
by a similar amount. Consequently, wealth managed by all lever-
aged funds is barely changed relative to the 9% benchmark level.
A short-selling ban increases wealth in leveraged long positions
by about one half, but reduces wealth in all leveraged positions
from 9% to 7.5%. Relative to the benchmark, a leverage ban gener-
ates a 60% increase in the wealth invested in portfolios that are
long in one asset only. Although margin restrictions curb leveraged
risk-taking, neither margin restrictions nor transaction taxes seem
to dampen the investors’ appetite for risk.
To explore the effects of regulation on trading styles, we collect
data for individual traders on portfolio holdings, trading activity
and sensitivity to information, and carry out a factor analysis foreach scenario. The estimated factor models turn out to be structur-
ally identical across scenarios, and individual factors can be inter-
preted in terms of real-world trading styles. We examine the
relative importance of these trading styles across scenarios and
ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences related to information acquisition and
investment horizon.
Data for the factor analyses are obtained by randomly selecting
one executed order for each scenario, run and day. This yields a
total of 4  200  10,000 = 8 million orders. For each order,
we compute values for the 12 variables listed in Table 9. The ﬁrst
four variables represent trader size, trade volume relative to
managed wealth, order type (limit or market order) and the dis-
tance of the trader’s portfolio from the market portfolio. The
remaining eight variables represent the sensitivity of the trader’s
strategy to information. For each information variable xj, an indica-
tor variable is set to 1 if a change in xj alters the quoted price by at
least one tick or the order quantity by at least one lot.14 Vectors of
indicator variables are divided by their sum (if positive) to obtain a
measure of the extent to which the trade was based on selective
information. Sensitivities to order book quantities are excluded to
avoid multi-collinearity, and all variables are standardized by run
to control for run level ﬁxed effects.
To select the number of factors for the models, we compute
eigenvalues from correlation matrices for the variables and include
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Fig. 2. Eigenvalues for factor model selection. For each scenario and run, we compute the 12-dimensional correlation matrix and its eigenvalues from a random sample of
10,000 individual orders. For each scenario, the box plots show the range; the ﬁrst and third quartiles; and the median of the 5 largest eigenvalues across the 200 runs of that
scenario.
Table 10
Trading styles. Executed orders are classiﬁed by proxy variables for selected styles
identiﬁed in Table 9, using the raw data of Table 9. The proxies are deﬁned
as T1 ¼ ðB3 ^ I1Þ ^ :I5; T2 ¼ ðI4 ^ I5Þ ^ :ðI6 ^ I7Þ; T3 ¼ ðI6 ^ I7Þ ^ :ðI4 ^ I5Þ; and T4 ¼
ðI4 ^ I5Þ _ ðI6 ^ I7Þ. The table contains means of relative frequencies computed by
run for each variable and scenario. Percentages do not add up to 100 because the
classiﬁcation is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. P-Values in parentheses
are calculated as in Table 7. The number of observations is 200 in each scenario.
No. Variable Base case No short No leverage Taxation
T1 Liquidity suppliers 18.7% 17.1% 16.8% 19.0%
(0.000) (0.091) (0.061) (0.766)
T2 Value traders 24.6% 21.9% 32.4% 16.7%
(0.000) (0.208) (0.001) (0.000)
T3 News traders/ arbs. 41.9% 49.6% 36.5% 47.3%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.012)
T4 Informed traders 83.3% 85.2% 82.0% 78.2%
(0.000) (0.100) (0.296) (0.000)
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teria for factor model selection, this one is vulnerable to sampling
error. We deal with this problem by computing distributions for
the eigenvalues with data from each of the 200 independent runs
for each scenario. Fig. 2 provides box plots of these distributions
for the ﬁve largest eigenvalues. As only the ﬁrst three eigenvalues
are consistently greater than 1 in each scenario, the analysis sug-
gests using three factors throughout.
Table 9 contains the results of estimating a three-factor model
for each of the four scenarios. The factors are ordered by explained
variance, except for the taxation case, where factors F2 and F3 are
swapped to facilitate comparison with the other scenarios. White
and black circles areas represent positive and negative factor load-
ings, respectively.
Factor F2 distinguishes between two types of informed trad-
ers.15 The factor assigns positive scores to traders who are sensitive
to information on market prices and RNPs, i.e., value traders. Nega-
tive scores are assigned to traders who are sensitive to daily changes
in those variables, i.e., news traders and arbitrageurs. Factor F1 dis-
tinguishes between two types of uninformed traders. It scores posi-
tive for traders who are sensitive to the bid-ask spread and prefer
limit to market orders. These characteristics are representative of
market makers and other specialized liquidity suppliers. Negative
scores are obtained by traders who pay attention to their portfolio
position and RNP, but who are insensitive to price information. These
traders appear to be involved in carry trades or other cyclical strat-
egies. F3 is a size factor which scores positive for large traders who
hold positions close to the market portfolio, and negative for small
traders who hold extreme positions and submit large orders relative
to their equity.
We next examine whether the distribution of these styles varies
across scenarios, Table 10. Styles are represented by proxy vari-
ables for liquidity suppliers, value traders, news traders and
informed traders (news or value traders) on the raw data of
Table 9.
Style distributions are qualitatively similar across scenarios
except for a few notable differences relative to the base case: (i)
Informed traders are underrepresented in the tax scenario; and
(ii) the ratio of news traders to value traders is substantially higher
in the tax scenario and lower in the scenario with a leverage ban.
The ﬁrst result supports Stiglitz’s (1989) hypothesis that a transac-
tion tax will reduce effort spent on information acquisition, but the
second one contradicts his conjecture that the tax discourages
short-term speculative trading by redirecting investors’ focus
towards the long term. In the tax scenario more funds hold the15 Informed traders are traders who can form rational beliefs about asset mispricing.
As a proxy we check whether a trader’s order is sensitive to the stock price and the
RNP or to changes in both variables.market portfolio. Since this strategy does not require information,
there is less information acquisition in the aggregate. The shift
from value investing to short-term speculation in the tax scenario
coincides with the shift in relative trading activity: Leveraged
funds contribute a larger proportion to the trade volume in the
tax scenario than in the benchmark case, Table 8. The results in
Table 10 suggest that a full leverage ban would advance the goal
of reducing the focus on the short-term. A pure short selling ban
would have the opposite effect, as it entails the largest number
of news traders among all four scenarios.
The emergence of different investment styles matters beyond
the issue of characterizing individual fund behavior. Since styles
reﬂect differences in the informational basis of trading decisions,
heterogeneity of styles can generate asymmetric information
among potential counterparties. For instance, our ﬁndings support
the standard view that market makers tend to be uninformed rel-
ative to their clients. This example illustrates the strength of our
modeling approach, which delivers the prediction without any
assumptions about trader types or costs of acquiring information.
3.2. Liquidity
Liquid markets offer investors the opportunity to trade large
volumes at low cost whenever they want to trade. When liquidity
dries up the consequences can be disastrous, as evidenced by the
failure of Bear Sterns and other major ﬁnancial ﬁrms in 2008
(Brunnermeier, 2009).
Transaction taxes are generally found to reduce liquidity
because trading becomes more costly. Sweden’s painful experience
with the effect of high transaction taxes in the late 1980s and early
1990s is a case in point. Campbell and Froot (1994) provide a
detailed account and also quantify the impact of the tax on
Table 11
Net liquidity supply. The data are annual means of daily observations of
100ðvLðPÞ  vMðPÞÞ=ðvLðPÞ þ vMðPÞÞ, where vLðPÞ is the limit order volume of all
traders in position P, and vMðPÞ is the corresponding market order volume. P-Values
and classiﬁcation of portfolio positions as in Table 7. The number of observations is
200 in each scenario.
Position Base case No short No leverage Taxation
Short 4.28 14.62
(0.000) (0.000)
All bond 1.51 6.00 1.48 5.91
(0.001) (0.000) (0.957) (0.000)
Overweight bond 4.39 4.50 0.66 10.61
(0.000) (0.847) (0.000) (0.000)
Market portfolio 4.04 4.41 0.82 11.85
(0.000) (0.500) (0.000) (0.000)
Overweight stock 2.63 2.03 2.91 7.96
(0.000) (0.146) (0.485) (0.000)
All stock 3.44 7.19 0.06 5.37
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leveraged long 1.80 9.73 4.47
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 12
Liquidity. The data set consists of run means of daily observations of each variable. For
each day, the closing bid and ask are computed as the median bid and ask across the
last 50 of 20,000 intraday time steps. The bid-ask spread is the difference between the
closing ask and bid. Market impact is the difference between the current bid (ask) and
the average execution price of a market sell (buy) order. Market impact is calculated
as (i) the average market impact across all market orders submitted during the day
(endogenous order size), and (ii) the average market impact of one large buy order
and one large sell order of 50,000 shares submitted at the close. The large order size
corresponds to 0.2% of the average daily trade volume in the base case. In the table,
spreads and market impacts are reported in basis points (bp) relative to the mid price.
Average order size on a given day is calculated as trade volume divided by the number
of trades. Days between trades is the average time, measured in days, between two
consecutive trades by the same investor, calculated as the number of investors
(20,000) divided by the number of trades on the given day. Turnover per day is trade
volume divided by the number of shares outstanding (10 million shares). Round-trip
cost is the total cost, including taxes, of buying and selling a volume equal to the
endogenous order size using market orders. P-Values in parentheses are calculated as
in Table 7. The number of observations is 200 in each scenario.
Base case No short No leverage Taxation
Bid-ask spread (bp) 10.18 9.60 10.93 20.64
(0.000) (0.059) (0.015) (0.000)
Market impact (bp) 1.07 0.91 1.96 5.26
(endogenous) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000)
Market impact (bp) 3.11 5.00 13.14 12.34
(50,000 shares) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average order size 6,067 3,330 2,012 1,980
(number of shares) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Days between trades 5.23 6.21 17.73 8.95
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover per day 2.46% 1.15% 0.24% 0.49%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Round-trip cost (bp) 12.32 11.43 14.85 51.16
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ments such as derivatives. Now as then, proponents of the tax
argue that low trading volume is a beneﬁt as it discourages
‘socially worthless activities’ by clever and overpaid people.16
There is also the, less commonly shared, view that frequent traders
are net liquidity takers and therefore by curtailing their activities
with a tax, liquidity may actually improve.
Theoretical studies ﬁnd that transaction taxes have negative
effects on trade frequency and volume (Constantinides, 1986;
Kupiec, 1996; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). By abstracting from
the market microstructure, these papers do not capture the full
equilibrium effect on trading costs which can also increase as a
result of wider spreads or a shallower book. In quote-driven mar-
kets, for instance, Subrahmanyam (1998) and Dupont and Lee
(2007) show that the impact of a tax on trading costs depends on
the competition between market-makers and the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry. We therefore expect to ﬁnd the tax to reduce
liquidity because some traders specialize in liquidity provision
(Section 3.1).
We analyze the net liquidity supply of different groups of inves-
tors, and provide results on order book properties and transaction
costs. Table 11 contains information on net liquidity supply. Trad-
ers are classiﬁed by portfolio positions at the time of order submis-
sion, and net liquidity supply is measured as the difference
between daily limit order and market order volume.17 The exe-
cuted volume of each order is attributed by equal parts to the tra-
der’s portfolio position at the time of the current and next order
submission. In the base scenario, active investors demand liquidity
and passive ones supply it. This pattern is enhanced when a transac-
tion tax is imposed, contrary to arguments put forward by its propo-
nents. Restriction of margin trade fundamentally alters the pattern
of net liquidity supply. Table 11 reveals that under a short-selling
ban the largest suppliers of liquidity are active traders who are con-
strained to holding all-bond portfolios. This effect disappears when
the ban on short selling is extended to a full leverage ban because
it hurts the customer base of market makers by eliminating all lev-
eraged speculation.
Table 12 contains results on market liquidity measured by the
bid-ask spread, market impact, order book depth and trading activ-
ity. The market impact of a buy (sell) order is the absolute differ-
ence between the current ask (bid) and the volume-weighted
execution price. Endogenous market impact is computed across
all executed orders, and order book depth is the market impact
of a large order (0.2% of the benchmark trade volume), computed
from the state of the book at the close of every trading day.
The base scenario is characterized by high liquidity with a low
quoted spread of about 10 basis points and an endogenous market
impact of only 1 basis point. The effects of the regulatory scenarios
on the quoted bid-ask spread and endogenous market impact are
small, except in the tax scenario where the spread is twice as high
as in the benchmark scenario and market impact is ﬁve times lar-
ger. The effects on order book depth are more pronounced. A ban
on short selling increases the market impact of the large order by
60%, and in the leverage ban and tax scenarios, the market impact
is about four times larger.
Trade frequency, order size and trade volume are highest in the
base scenario, Table 12. A ban on short selling reduces trade vol-
ume to about 50% of the benchmark level, and a leverage ban cuts
it down to 10%. The transaction tax, despite being only 10 basis
points, reduces the trade volume to 20% of the benchmark level.16 See Section 2.1.1 in Campbell and Froot (1994) for more details on these
comments and the Swedish experience.
17 For every order that is executed in full or part, the quantity that is executed
against standing limit orders is classiﬁed as a market order, and any quantity that is
executed against incoming market orders is classiﬁed as a limit order.Differences in trade volumes are mainly due to differences in order
sizes, except in the leverage ban scenario where a small order size
is accompanied by a very low trade frequency.
The net effects of differences in liquidity on trading costs are
shown in Table 12. Round-trip cost is the average cost incurred
by a trader who uses market orders to open and close a position.
It amounts to the effective spread (bid-ask spread plus two times
the average market impact) in addition to the tax, if any. Relative
to the base scenario, a ban on short selling reduces the round-trip
cost by a marginal amount, while a leverage ban leads to a moder-
ate increase. In contrast, the transaction tax increases the round-
trip cost from 12 to 51 bp, of which 20 bp are directly related to
the tax. The remaining 19 bp are due to a higher effective spread.
This implies that 97.5% of the transaction tax falls on the liquidity
takers. To see this, consider a round-trip involving an impatient
Table 13
Long swings in asset prices. For each scenario, Peak-to-trough is the mean percentage
decline in the stock price from the peak in an expansion to the trough in the
subsequent recession. An expansion (recession) is deﬁned as an interval of trading
days T ¼ ft1; . . . ; tkg such that the state variable st is 1 (0) on all days in T and 0 (1) on
days t1  1 and tk þ 1. There are 687 of these events across the 200 independent runs
of the model. High (Low) is the mean across 200 runs of the maximum (minimum)
closing stock price across all 10,000 trading days of that run. Range is the difference
between High and Low. For the base case, the p-values in parentheses refer to one-
sample t-tests of zero means. For the other scenarios, they refer to paired t-tests of
differences in means between that scenario and the base case.
# obs. Base case No short No leverage Taxation
Peak-to-trough 4  687 43.1% 39.6% 38.3% 42.4%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.055)
High 4  200 21.49 22.15 21.55 21.59
(0.000) (0.100) (0.872) (0.781)
Low 4  200 8.16 9.37 9.39 8.48
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Range 4  200 13.33 12.78 12.15 13.11
(0.000) (0.200) (0.002) (0.513)
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20 bp to each party. In addition, the trader pays the market maker
19 bp as a result of the increased effective spread. This amount
almost covers the tax bill of the market maker, except for a 1 bp
reduction in proﬁts.
The negative impact of the short-selling ban on trade volume
and trading activity are consistent with the empirical evidence.
Studies of the 2008 short-selling ban ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative
effects on liquidity, price discovery and volatility, see, e.g.,
Battalio and Schultz (2011), Beber and Pagano (2013), Boehmer
et al. (2013), Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010), Kolasinski et al.
(2013), and Marsh and Payne (2012). However, the dramatic
increase in the transaction costs of banned stocks reported by
Boehmer et al. (2013) is not observed as an equilibrium effect in
the model. This suggests that some of the empirical results on
short-selling bans may be due to short-run effects which are not
equilibrium phenomena.
The 2008 U.S. short-selling ban differs from the ban considered
in our model in three main respects: (1) The ban was an emergency
action taken in response to a severe decline in the market values of
ﬁnancial stocks; (2) the announcement marked an unexpected and
temporary shift in the regulatory regime; and (3) during the 15
trading days the ban was imposed, prices of banned stocks contin-
ued to fall along with the overall market.
To assess the short-term effects of a temporary ban on short
selling, we carried out a controlled experiment in a similar market
situation within our modeling framework. From each run of the
base scenario, a period of market distress is selected that resembles
the situation of the 2008 short-selling ban. This is done by choos-
ing a period of 1 year and 15 days from each run of the base case as
follows: For all periods, percentage declines in RNP over the ﬁrst
year and the subsequent 15 days are calculated separately, and
the period with the largest product of the two percentage declines
is selected. The last 15 days become the intra-ban period for the
experiment. Data are collected from 200 runs on time paths for
the earnings process identical to those of the base case, but with
a temporary ban on short selling in place during each intra-ban
period.
During the simulated 15-day ban, percentage volume-weighted
spreads and endogenous market impact increase by 90% and 146%
relative to the base case, while trade volume and the number of
trades decrease by 22% and 18%, respectively. On day 15 of the
ban, the stock price is up 9.4% relative to the base case. This is in
line with the ﬁndings of Harris et al. (2013), who estimate a 10–
12% price increase during the 2008 ban. Differences in stock prices
and trading activity between the two scenarios increase through-
out the temporary ban, but systematic differences in spreads and
market impact disappear halfway through the ban. These ﬁndings
suggest that lower trading activity is a permanent effect of a short-
selling ban, while higher transaction costs are a temporary phe-
nomenon associated with an unexpected change in the regulatory
regime.
3.3. Market dynamics and the business cycle
The effect of regulation on long-term market movements
is inﬂuenced by the governance structures in the portfolio
management industry. Under delegated fund management, the
principal-agent relationship between investors and fund managers
relies on past performance as a proxy for unobservable skill, see
e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997). This will induce short sellers to
increase their positions during downturns and decrease them dur-
ing upturns, as observed by Lamont and Stein (2004). Short-selling
bans could therefore beneﬁt long-term market stability. In con-
trast, transaction taxes impact the order ﬂow by raising the cost
of trading, but have no direct effect on the cost of portfolioholdings. Their effect on long swings in asset prices is therefore less
clear.
The destabilizing effects of leverage are well documented in the
theoretical literature. Leverage can exacerbate asset price move-
ments through several channels: directly affecting borrowing
capacity (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), pro-cyclical borrowing
induced by counter-cyclical volatility (Adrian and Shin, 2010), ﬁre
sales in illiquid markets during downturns (Shleifer and Vishny,
1992, 2011), and forced closure of arbitrage fund managers’ posi-
tions when mispricing becomes more severe (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). Similar mechanisms are present in our model: Short
positions are increased when stock prices fall, volatility, bid-ask
spread and market impact are all counter-cyclical, and losses on
speculative positions increase the risk of client attrition.
We ﬁnd that leverage restrictions dampen long swings in asset
prices by preventing bear runs during recessions, while a transac-
tion tax has no effect. The peak-to-trough variable in Table 13 mea-
sures the amplitude of price movements over business cycles as
the mean percentage decline in the stock price from a peak in an
expansion to the trough in the subsequent recession. In the bench-
mark scenario, the mean peak-to-trough decline across 687 busi-
ness cycles is 43.1%. Both types of leverage restrictions have a
dampening effect on long-term price movements. A ban on short
selling reduces the mean decline by 3.5 percentage points to
39.6%, and a leverage ban reduces it by 4.8 percentage points to
38.3%. A transaction tax, on the other hand, has no signiﬁcant effect
on the mean peak-to-trough decline.
Peak-to-trough movements are largely determined by the dif-
ference in average price levels observed during booms and reces-
sions. In Table 13 the variables ‘High’ and ‘Low’ are the means of
maximal and minimal stock prices across 200 40-year periods,
and ‘Range’ is the difference between ‘High’ and ‘Low.’ While the
high mean does not differ signiﬁcantly across scenarios, the low
mean is 4% higher in the tax scenario and 15% higher in the two
scenarios with a short-selling ban. The range is narrower under a
full leverage ban, but is not signiﬁcantly different in the other three
scenarios. We can therefore conclude that leverage restrictions
reduce long swings by supporting stock prices during recessions.
The effect can be explained by analyzing differences in the
cyclicality of the stock price discount across scenarios. The dis-
count is the percentage amount by which the market price of the
stock is lower than its risk-neutral price. Table 14 shows that the
discount on the stock moves counter-cyclically in all scenarios,
but less so in those two where short selling is banned. The more
moderate reaction of the discount in these two scenarios is due
to leverage restrictions reducing downward price pressure from
counter-cyclical short selling. Stock prices are supported during
Table 14
Comovement of selected market indicators with the risk-neutral stock price (RNP).
Market indicators are discount (percentage amount by which the market price of the
stock is lower than its risk-neutral price), short interest (shares sold short in percent of
shares outstanding), and long leverage (bonds sold short in percent of bonds
outstanding). For each scenario, we sort all data records (200  10,000) by RNP,
split the data set into 1,000 bins of size 0.1%, and compute the mean of each variable
on the 2,000 observations of each bin. The mean RNP of each bin is identical across
scenarios because the realizations of RNP are identical by run. We regress each
variable on RNP by OLS for each scenario and report the coefﬁcient on RNP. For the
base case, we also report p-values in parenthesis. For the other scenarios, the p-values
refer to tests of differences in the coefﬁcients on RNP relative to the base case. The
number of observations is 1,000 for each scenario.
Base case No short No leverage Taxation
Discount 1.952 1.602 1.396 1.889
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Short interest 1.164 1.059
(0.000) (0.000)
Long leverage 0.007 0.231 0.079
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 15
Price ﬂuctuations and price discovery. For each scenario and run, we calculate the R2
obtained by regressing daily log returns on daily log innovations in the RNP of the
stock. Upside and downside R2 are calculated in the same way, except for restricting
the data to days with a non-decreasing and decreasing RNP, respectively. Downside-
minus-upside R2 is the difference between the downside and the upside R2.
Annualized volatility, skewness and excess kurtosis are calculated by run from daily
log-returns. P-Values in parentheses are calculated as in Table 7. The number of
observations is 200 in each scenario.
Base case No short No leverage Taxation
Stock price 15.37 16.45 16.10 15.47
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.388)
R2 0.874 0.939 0.943 0.830
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 down-up 0.037 0.008 0.014 0.041
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.482)
Volatility (annualized) 17.36 14.73 14.29 16.53
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Skewness 0.08 0.31 0.22 0.01
(0.323) (0.000) (0.000) (0.279)
Excess kurtosis 18.34 7.27 5.55 10.45
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.021)
18 Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that this effect persists in a dynamic model
with both rational and overconﬁdent investors.
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speculative bear runs. Indeed, we observe counter-cyclical short
interest in the base and tax scenarios, with short positions increas-
ing during downturns and decreasing during upturns, Table 14.
This is consistent with Lamont and Stein’s (2004) observation that
short interest moved counter-cyclically during the dot-com
bubble.
Counter-cyclical short selling is a consequence of delegated
fund management, as predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
Short sellers experience capital losses during upturns, and negative
proﬁts during booms when dividends are high. Their poor perfor-
mance leads to a further reduction of wealth under management
as clients withdraw funds. In downturns, capital gains are positive,
and short sellers continue to perform well throughout the reces-
sion when dividends are consistently low. The good performance
leads to an inﬂow of funds to short sellers which, in turn, allows
them to take on larger positions.
In recessions, a short position is effectively a bet on high rates of
bankruptcies among companies in the real economy. A short posi-
tion generates a positive cash ﬂow at the time of sale and, if the
company is bankrupt, clears the short position at no cost. Lever-
aged long positions are different because borrowed bonds have
to be repaid in full. Consequently, the incentives to hold leveraged
long positions during booms are weaker than the incentives to
hold short positions during busts. This difference in incentives
explains the differences in cyclicality between short interest and
long leverage in the base and tax scenarios of Table 14.
To sum up, our model predicts that leverage restrictions dam-
pen long swings in asset prices by preventing bear runs caused
by short sellers who speculate on ﬁnancial distress of companies
in the real economy. The transaction tax has no beneﬁcial effect
on long term price swings because it does not alter the incentives
to hold leveraged positions.
3.4. Pricing and price discovery
This section is concernedwith the effect of regulation on the level
and information content of stock prices. From a macroeconomic
perspective, higher stock prices reduce the cost of capital which
promotes growth. Consequently, regulatory reform can improve
welfare if it increases stock prices by reducing price ﬂuctuations
or by increasing the demand for stocks in other ways. On the
micro level, efﬁcient capital allocation relies on informationally
efﬁcient prices.
We ﬁnd that stock prices are highest under the short-selling
ban and lowest in the base and tax scenarios, Table 15. The major
part of these differences can be accounted for by volatility which ishighest in the base scenario, somewhat lower in the tax scenario,
and much lower in the two scenarios with leverage restrictions.
Lower volatility under the short-selling ban is in line with the
empirical ﬁndings of Chang et al. (2007) and the increase in stock
price with those in Chang et al. (2012). Both observations are con-
ﬁrmed by Chang et al. (2012) who use a unique data set of Chinese
stocks for which short-selling constraints were removed in 2010.
In our model a short-selling ban increases the equilibrium price
level by 7%, but a full leverage ban increases it by only 5%, despite
lower volatility in this scenario. We attribute the difference to
Miller (1977) result on overvaluation in markets with diverging
opinions and short-selling constraints.18
Empirical studies ﬁnd that transaction taxes lower asset prices
(Schwert and Seguin, 1993; Umlauf, 1993; Bond et al., 2004;
Matheson, 2011). Theoretical work by Kupiec (1996) predicts that
prices will be reduced by the net present value of future tax pay-
ments. In our model, every transaction involves a sale of one asset
and a purchase of equal value of the other. Since the tax is paid by
both parties to the transaction, no asset has a tax advantage, and
there is no effect on their relative prices. This observation lends
support to a point made by the proponents of a transaction tax.
If the tax is introduced, it should be global and uniform to cover
all asset classes. Otherwise distortions may occur and the cost of
capital is raised for issuers of taxed versus non-taxed assets.
To study the information content of prices, we adapt the statis-
tical measures of Bris et al. (2007) to our context. Price efﬁciency is
measured as the R2 in regressions of daily log stock returns on daily
log innovations to RNP. We test for asymmetric price discovery of
good and bad news by computing upside (downside) R2 in the
same way for days with an increasing (decreasing) RNP. R2 and
the difference between downside and upside R2 are reported in
Table 15.
Price efﬁciency is worst in the tax scenario, better in the base
case, and best in the two scenarios with leverage restrictions.
Inferior price discovery in the tax scenario is due in part to
higher transaction costs which generate larger hysteresis in the
traders’ response to information, as predicted by Constantinides
(1986). The positive effect of the short-selling ban on price
discovery is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in Chang
et al. (2012) and Chang et al. (2012) but at odds with Bris
et al. (2007).
Table 16
Margin trading during extreme events. For each scenario and run, we identify the most extreme event, deﬁned as the 5-day period that maximizes the range of the log closing
stock price p across all 5-day periods of that run. For each extreme event, we collect information about changes in the log stock price Dp, short interest DSI, and long leverage DLL.
We also compute net margin trade DðLL SIÞ. All variables are normalized by their respective standard deviations computed by run on the full samples. The table contains
conditional means and medians for each variable for negative extreme events, Dp < 0, and positive extreme events, Dp > 0. For the base case, the P-Values refer to one-sample
Wilcoxon tests. For the other scenarios, they refer to Mann–Whitney U tests of differences between that scenario and the base case. The number of observations is 200 in each
scenario.
Base case No short Taxation
Dp < 0 Dp > 0 Dp < 0 Dp > 0 Dp < 0 Dp > 0
Change in short interest
Mean 5.53 10.69 5.62 12.78
Median 4.78 6.43 5.18 9.26
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.653) (0.077)
Change in long leverage
Mean 4.02 2.62 4.97 3.62 6.05 4.56
Median 4.32 2.36 6.02 3.88 6.56 4.62
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.128) (0.000) (0.001)
Net margin trade
Mean 2.44 8.76 4.97 3.62 1.06 9.77
Median 1.68 3.24 6.02 3.88 0.79 5.20
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.668)
Change in stock price
Mean 8.96 11.42 8.77 8.03 9.27 10.11
Median 8.58 9.83 8.30 7.84 8.57 8.85
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.286) (0.000) (0.584) (0.054)
Number of observations 122 78 155 45 118 82
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cating that the market digests bad news more efﬁciently than good
news. The asymmetry is lowest in the scenario where short selling
is banned. This is consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1987)
prediction that restrictions on short selling can impede price dis-
covery in response to bad news under asymmetric information.
However, downside-minus-upside R2 is only slightly higher under
a full leverage ban. This is a puzzle. Although we do not impose pri-
vate information on the model, funds are still asymmetrically
informed due to the specialization on trading styles that prevails
in equilibrium. The result should therefore, at least in part, be dri-
ven by the mechanism described in Diamond and Verrecchia’s
(1987). If this reasoning were correct, a full leverage ban should
restore the asymmetry observed in the benchmark model. This
does not happen, which indicates that other mechanisms may be
driving these results.
It turns out that these observations can be reconciled by consid-
ering the impact of extreme events on the measure of price efﬁ-
ciency. The results in Table 16 suggest that the price discovery
measure R2 is strongly inﬂuenced by bear runs and short squeezes.
During extreme events, deﬁned as 5-day periods with abnormally
large absolute returns, shorters sell large amounts of stock when
prices fall. When prices rise, they buy twice as much per unit of
time as margin violations trigger forced liquidation. Traders who
are leveraged long do the opposite, but to a lesser extent. There-
fore, when short-selling is allowed, net margin trade destabilizes
prices during extreme events, and more so during short squeezes
relative to bear runs. This scrambles the relationship between
returns and innovations to RNP, producing higher kurtosis and
lower price efﬁciency in terms of R2 (Table 15). In addition, the
asymmetry generates less negative skewness and higher down-
side-minus-upside R2.
Dropping the 10 most extreme events from each run, the differ-
ence in downside-minus-upside R2 between the base case and the
short-sale ban scenario is reduced from 0.029 (Table 15) to 0.016.
Our estimate of the negative effect of the short-sale ban on price
discovery in response to bad news is therefore biased upwards
by more than 80%. This illustrates that price dynamics during
extreme events can distort standard measures of price efﬁciency
that have been used to draw inferences about asymmetric pricediscovery with respect to good and bad news. A similar point is
made by Chang et al. (2012).4. Conclusion
Financial stability is high on the agenda of politicians and regu-
lators. Several measures have been proposed to deal with the
recent crises, but quantitative knowledge about their long-term
implications is scarce. Our paper introduces a new methodology
to quantify the effects of regulatory reform in an equilibrium
model with market microstructure. We apply this methodology
to measure the effects of leverage restrictions and ﬁnancial trans-
action taxes on market quality and ﬁnancial stability. The approach
enables a detailed analysis of the dynamic equilibrium of portfolio
choice, trading activity, market quality and price dynamics under
the different regulatory measures.
We ﬁnd that a short-selling ban reduces both short-term vola-
tility and long swings in asset prices which positively impacts price
discovery and lowers the cost of capital. There is no adverse effect
on transaction costs but liquidity is worse in terms of trade volume
and order book depth. A leverage ban enhances the positive effects
of the short-selling ban on market stability, but liquidity is very
poor, and the cost of capital is higher. A ﬁnancial transaction tax
has a negative impact on liquidity and price discovery, but no sig-
niﬁcant effect on long swings in asset prices.
Our analysis suggests several new hypotheses for empirical
investigation: (1) Introduction of a short-selling ban has a perma-
nent effect on stock prices and trading activity, but only a tempo-
rary effect on transaction costs; (2) Evidence of inferior price
discovery related to negative information about stocks subject to
a short-selling ban can be accounted for by asymmetric price
dynamics during extreme events; (3) Transaction taxes shift the
focus of investors from value investment to news trading; (4)
Transaction taxes induce investors to hold the market portfolio,
but do not curb the extent of speculative positions.
The model can be extended in several directions. Alternative
forms of ﬁnancial transaction taxes can be examined with only
minimal changes to the model. For example, tax exemption for
market makers can be represented by charging the full amount
118 T. Lensberg et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 51 (2015) 103–118of the tax to the market order side of every transaction. A prelimin-
ary analysis of this case suggests that the main impact of such a
change in the tax base is a substantial reduction in effective
spreads along with an increase in order book depth. By adding a
call auction mechanism, one can analyze circuit breakers, as well
as the relative merits of continuous trading and repeated auctions.
The effect of regulatory discrimination between asset classes can
be explored by introducing cash as a medium of exchange and
trading different assets against cash on separate order books.Acknowledgement
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